The Local Plan depends on multiple pieces of technical evidence covering transport, water, wastewater, flooding, utilities, healthcare and viability.
This tracker summarises the key findings from each available document and highlights where the evidence is strong, and where uncertainty remains.
Fuller information is available via the links for anyone who wants to explore in detail.
01
Transport evidence
The Strategic Transport Study provides a strong strategic assessment of how growth affects the district’s transport network. It recognises existing congestion, tests multiple growth scenarios, and consistently concludes that a major A141 and St Ives transport intervention is fundamental to delivering the Local Plan. As the study notes, removing the A141 scheme would lead to “higher congestion, longer journey times, reduced public transport use” (Strategic Transport Study, p.2).
However, the transport modelling has not been updated since 2025, meaning newer proposals such as Sapley Park, Newlands Logistics Park, Project Fairfax and Brampton Cross may not be fully represented. The evidence also assumes delivery of the A141 scheme, but the Outline Business Case is still under review and construction is not expected until around 2030–2033 (Strategic Transport Study, p.2).
Key uncertainty: The Local Plan depends heavily on infrastructure that is not yet approved, funded or guaranteed.
02
Water, wastewater and flooding
The water evidence has improved significantly, with clearer identification of constraints across water supply, wastewater treatment and flood risk. The July 2026 Water Cycle Study recognises Huntingdonshire as “a seriously water-stressed area” and identifies multiple wastewater treatment works with limited capacity (Water Cycle Study, p.1).
The most critical issue is Huntingdon (Godmanchester) WRC, assessed as RED, with “no capacity for growth and no named WRC growth scheme in AMP8” (Water Cycle Study, p.2). Anglian Water confirms there is currently no capacity for further growth beyond existing commitments. Yet the study models 14,419 dwellings and significant employment floorspace within this catchment.
Flood risk evidence is stronger, but detailed local risks — drainage ditches, culverts, historic flooding — still require site-specific assessment.
Key uncertainty: Infrastructure solutions are identified but not yet funded, permitted, or scheduled, and may rely on future AMP9 investment.
03
Infrastructure Delivery Study
The Stage 2 Infrastructure Delivery Study is a major improvement, recognising cumulative impacts and identifying critical, essential and desirable infrastructure. It openly acknowledges constraints including water stress, wastewater limits, electricity reinforcement and ambulance service pressure.
Crucially, it states: “A key transport mitigation project, critical to the delivery of the strategic sites in and around Huntingdon, is the A141 bypass” (IDS, p.1).
However, the IDS identifies what is needed but not how it will be delivered. Funding, governance, delivery programmes and contingency arrangements remain unclear. Electricity infrastructure for the North Huntingdon Growth Cluster is still high-level, and healthcare modelling focuses on floorspace rather than workforce capacity.
Key uncertainty: The evidence is strong vertically (sector by sector) but weak horizontally - it does not demonstrate how 24,000 homes and major employment growth can be delivered as one coordinated programme.
04
Statements of Common Ground
The SoCGs show improved cooperation between HDC and infrastructure providers. Anglian Water now recognises cumulative impacts and is actively engaged in planning wastewater upgrades. The NHS acknowledges cross-boundary pressures. UKPN confirms long-term engagement and joint forward planning. The Environment Agency and LLFA have agreed methodologies for flood risk assessment.
However, cooperation does not equal delivery. The Anglian Water SoCG does not confirm funding approval, delivery dates or occupation triggers. The NHS SoCG remains weak on workforce capacity and hospital pressures. UKPN still lacks detail on substation locations and reinforcement timescales.
As the summary notes, the SoCGs “demonstrate cooperation but not certainty” (SoCG Summary, p.1).
Key uncertainty: Major infrastructure remains dependent on future investment decisions outside HDC’s control.
05
Whole Plan Viability Assessment
Despite its title, the Whole Plan Viability Assessment does not assess whether the Local Plan is deliverable as a functioning whole. It tests individual sites and policies, assuming infrastructure costs and timing from the IDS are correct.
It does not model cumulative interactions such as simultaneous delivery of Wyton Airfield, Lodge Farm and Giffords Park, shared infrastructure dependencies, or delays to the A141 or wastewater upgrades. As the report states: “The Strategic Sites are tested individually” (WPVA, p.2).
Several strategic sites are “finely balanced”, infrastructure costs materially affect viability, and a 5–10% increase in build costs could render multiple sites unviable.
Key uncertainty: The Local Plan’s cumulative deliverability is not tested.